

Monday, 8 July, 1946

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST
Court House of the Tribunal
War Ministry Building
Tokyo, Japan

The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
at 0930.

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Appearances:

For the Tribunal, same as before with the
exception of HON. DELFIN JARANILLA, Justice, Member
from the Commonwealth of the Philippines, who is not
sitting.

For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

For the Defense Section, same as before.

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(English to Japanese and Japanese
to English interpretation was made by OKA,
Takashi and TSUCHIYA, Jun, Sho Onodera act-
ing as Monitor.)

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session
3 and is ready to hear any matter brought before it.

4 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present
5 except OKAWA and HIRANUMA.

6 I have here a certificate from the Prison
7 Medical Officer at Sugamo to this effect:

8 "This is to certify that Kiichiro HIRA-
9 NUMA is under treatment for an upper respiratory
10 infection, and is therefore unable to attend the
11 trials."

12 I take that to mean that for the time being
13 he is unable to attend the trial.

14 The corrections of the record as of the
15 14th of May and the 13th and 17th of June, sought by
16 Major Blakeney, having been found in order, will be
17 made.

18 Does any counsel desire to mention any mat-
19 ter?

20 (No reply.)

21 We will now take the cross-examination of
22 the witness General TANAKA. I notice that he men-
23 tioned the names of five of the accused, and it may
24 be desirable that the cross-examination should be
25 conducted by the counsel representing those five

TANAKA

CROSS

1 accused, if that can be arranged.

2 MR. HAYASHI: I am HAYASHI, Itsuro, counsel
3 for the defendant, HASHIMOTO, Kingoro.

4 The witness is very proficient in English,
5 but unfortunately I am not; so I would be happy if
6 in making his replies he would answer "yes" and "no"
7 in Japanese.

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1 R Y U K I C H I T A N A K A , called as a witness
2 on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand
3 and testified as follows:

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. HAYASHI:

6 Q Was there any serious circumstances surround-
7 ing your departure from the -- your leaving the army
8 when the Greater East Asia War was at its climax?

9 A Yes.

10 Q What were the circumstances?

11 A I shall speak of it in detail. Just before
12 the departure of Ambassador NOMURA for the United
13 States, I had occasion to speak intimately with
14 Colonel IWAKURA, who was a member of the Ambassadorial
15 Suite. IWAKURA at that time advocated a strong policy
16 toward the United States and Britain. I am not partic-
17 ularly one who advocated a pro-British or pro-American
18 policy, but after the battle of Chang-ku-feng I very
19 strongly felt the importance of material strength in
20 war. In that battle of Chang-ku-feng our forces demon-
21 strated their fighting spirit to the highest pitch, but
22 in accordance with the report sent from the fighting --
23 the combat zone to the central authorities, that bat-
24 tle was not a victory. I can say very positively at
25 this time that if that battle had continued for two

TANAKA

CROSS

1 more days it would have ended in the same way as the
2 battle at Nomónhon. I know this because I was the
3 commander of an artillery unit in the division that
4 participated in that battle. It was because of these
5 reasons that I told Colonel IWAKURA, not as Chief of
6 the Military Service Bureau of the War Ministry, but
7 as his senior officer, that whatever the circumstances,
8 he try his utmost to work for a compromise with the
9 United States. Half-jokingly, he said, "I will ac-
10 cept your threat and do what I can."

11 THE MONITOR: Correction: He jokingly said,
12 "I will threaten them and sometimes I will cater to
13 them, and will get the result you want." But he said
14 this in a joking manner.

15 A (Continued) Furthermore, I told him that I
16 was neither afraid of the United States nor a pro-
17 American advocate, but I did say that I very much
18 feared America's material strength. My official
19 duties were not directly concerned with the negotia-
20 tions with the United States. At that time I was in
21 the War Ministry as Chief of the Military Service
22 Bureau and had occasion to listen to reports entirely
23 devoid of opinions or emotions from the Chief of the
24 Military Affairs Section, Colonel SATO as well as
25 General KIMURA, Vice Minister of War. Vice Minister

TANAKA

CROSS

1 KIMURA was not an advocate of war with the United
2 States, and told me, not on one occasion alone, that
3 if Ambassador KURUSU went to the United States a
4 settlement could be reached between the two countries.

5 THE MONITOR: A slight addition: Vice Minis-
6 ter KIMURA was not an advocate -- did not advocate
7 war with the United States at that time. Addition:
8 "At that time."

9 A (Continued) However, war finally broke out
10 between Japan and the United States, and in view of
11 my official duties in the field of military adminis-
12 tration, related especially to the defense of the
13 homeland, I made a trip throughout Japan covering
14 Kyoto, Kyushu, Hiroshima, Nagoya, Osaka, Sapporo, Kobe
15 Asahigawa, Tokyo, and other places, to inspect
16 defense installations to a single gun.

17 In November of the year 1931, a student
18 military maneuvers were carried on -- carried out at
19 the Shimoshizu. Those maneuvers I attended, and at
20 that time I met Colonel NAKANISHI and had him explain
21 to me to the smallest detail the proficiency and
22 quality of Japanese aircraft.

23 THE MONITOR: Correction: 1941 instead of '31.

24 A (Continued) At that time he said that he
25 could not speak of this openly; that from the point

TANAKA

CROSS

1 of view of quality, Japanese aircraft was bad, and
2 that there was no question whatsoever from the stand-
3 point of quantity. Then I told him, "Why don't you
4 frankly speak of these matters to your senior offi-
5 cers?" At that time Colonel NAKANISHI said that if
6 he did so he would be fired. I was most seriously
7 concerned with the fact that the war with the United
8 States had every possibility of developing into a
9 protracted war, and that if the war became protracted
10 Japan --- the Japanese homeland would be bombed by
11 enemy aircraft; and speaking from my own experience
12 in the battle of Chang-ku-feng I knew the character
13 of modern war and came to the conclusion that if
14 Japan -- if the Japanese homeland is bombed the war
15 would end, in spite of our fighting spirit, in our
16 defeat.

17 THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, are these the an-
18 swers you want? The witness appears to have taken
19 complete control of you.

20 MR. HAYASHI: I wish to ask him to tell me,
21 much more simply, the reason why he resigned from the
22 army.

23 MR. SACKETT: If the Court please, there
24 was a fundamental break between this witness and the
25 Japanese army. He has been asked to explain it, and

TANAKA

CROSS

1 I think this is essential to disclose the real
2 essence of the break between this man and the army.

3 THE PRESIDENT: I am just inquiring. Counsel
4 is inclined to let him go, and so am I.

5 MR. HAYASHI: I only want to know the direct
6 reason why he resigned from the army.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Put that question to him.

8 Q What is the direct reason for your resigna-
9 tion from the army?

10 A There are two reasons for my resignation
11 from the army: one reason was the state of our
12 defense installations and equipment -- air defense
13 particularly -- as well as the friction between the
14 army and navy, and the fear of subordinates to report
15 to their senior officers, especially to the War Minis-
16 try; the state of our material preparations, especially
17 with respect to shipping, for fear of dismissal. Further-
18 more, the war situation was not truthfully nor fully
19 reported, especially with respect to our material
20 requirements: particularly, food, steel, coal, and
21 other vital necessities. The production increase did
22 not go according to original plans. As a result, the
23 future of this war became hopeless. I was taken with
24 insomnia. As a result, on the 21st of September, 1942,
25 I approached War Minister TOJO and told him that

1 "Your Excellency seems to have a feeling of certainty
2 in Japanese victory. I, however, feel that such a
3 victory is hopeless, and therefore, in order to en-
4 able the men who still have confidence in victory to
5 go on with their task unobstructed, I would resign."
6 I further stated that my health at that time was not
7 quite well, and I was not able to undertake the heavy
8 duties of my office.

9 MR. WARREN: If the Tribunal please, this
10 witness is making a speech. He is not answering the
11 question, and we would like to request the Tribunal to
12 tell this witness to answer the questions and quit
13 making speeches.

14 THE PRESIDENT: Well, just at the end of the
15 speech, when you intervened, Major Warren, he said
16 something very material, and if he continues along
17 those lines there can be no objection. He might be
18 asked what reasons he gave to TOJO. I think he has
19 given us those now fully enough.

20 A (Continued) The second reason for my resig-
21 nation is that in accordance with my conscience, or
22 to be true to my conscience, I felt that I was no
23 longer qualified as a regular army officer. Still
24 another reason for my resignation was this: At that
25 time, although I was very much indebted to His

TANAKA

CROSS

1 Excellen~~3y~~ TOJO, he said that Japan was going to fight
2 to the last man. This, I believe, was absolutely im-
3 possible. At that time the question arose as to the
4 establishment of the Ministry for Greater East Asiatic
5 Affairs, and in this connection, I approached His
6 Excellency, the Foreign Minister TOGO, and asked him
7 to start a political movement by which to oust General
8 TOJO. By so doing I violated a fundamental rule which
9 all soldiers were required to follow -- that of inter-
10 fering in politics -- and although this was against
11 my conscience, I did so.

12 For these above reasons I abandoned or left
13 the army.

14 Q After you left the army were you ever in the
15 Konodai National Hospital because of a brain disease?

16 A Yes.

17 Q How long were you in this hospital?

18 THE MONITOR: From what date to what date?

19 A From the 12th of November to the 22nd or 23rd
20 of December, 1942, I think, although my memory is not
21 exact.

22 Q Have you ever drunk opium -- smoked opium?

23 A Two or three times in China -- yes, two or
24 three times in China.

25 Q You have stated that you first met HASHIMOTO,

TANAKA

CROSS

1 Kingoro, in 1929, at the time HASHIMOTO was in Turkey,
2 and he did not return to Japan until the following
3 year. Was that a mistake in your memory?

4 A That was the 5th year of Showa, and it would
5 have been a mistake in my memory with respect to the
6 western calendar; that would have been 1930.

7 Q (In Japanese, but not interpreted.)

8 A Will you repeat that again?

9 Q You have said that you met HASHIMOTO, Kingoro,
10 in 1934, at either the Akebonoso or the Fujimikeh; but
11 what date -- what hour of what day of what month was
12 that meeting?

13 A I think that question is slightly mistaken,
14 as I did not say Fujimikeh.

15 Q Please look up the record.

16 A I said Akebomoso very definitely.

17 Q When?

18 A At that time I received a report from Cap-
19 tain SUZUKI, Kyo, attached to the Army General Staff
20 at the time, to the effect that Colonel HASHIMOTO was
21 coming up to Tokyo from Mishina for a dinner party.
22 If my memory serves me right, that was in the summer
23 of that year. Since this took place quite a long
24 time ago, I do not remember the date exactly.
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1 Q Who and who assembled at that time?

2 A According to my recollections, there were
3 seven or eight men at that dinner party but of the
4 names I remember, Captain SUZUKI, Kyo, who was more
5 or less manager of the party, and the then Colonel
6 HASHIMOTO.

7 Q HASHIMOTO does not know where the restaurant
8 Akebonoso is. Have you made a mistake in your memory?

9 A This restaurant Akebonoso is located at
10 Toranomōn, Tokyo, and was frequented by Army officers
11 because the prices of dinners were inexpensive.

12 Q Are you a member of the Sakura-kai?

13 A I am not a member.

14 Q Are General ITAGAKI and Lieutenant General
15 ISHIHARA members of this society?

16 A They are not members.

17 Q Then this meeting at the Akebonoso was not a
18 meeting of the Sakura-kai, was it?

19 A Yes, as you say.

20 Q Are you aware of the fact that at the time the
21 Sakura-kai was formed, politicians and the capitalists
22 were very corrupt and that the giving and taking of
23 bribes was an accepted practice?

24 A I cannot say that I have ever seen a bribe being
25 negotiated but it was general knowledge at that time to

TANAKA

CROSS

1 those who were concerned with the welfare of the nation
2 that such a practice was going on. That fact I do
3 confirm.

4 Q Are you aware that, at the time the Sakura-kai
5 was formed, WAKATSUKI, who later became Premier at the
6 time of the October Incident, was investigated by the
7 Prosecutor's Office on the suspicion of having received
8 a bribe of a hundred thousand yen from KUSUMI, Toma,
9 of the Echigo Railway.

10 A Yes, I know that by reports in the news-
11 papers.

12 Q Were you in favor of the object of the
13 Sakura-kai to reform the political world?

14 A Yes, very much in favor.

15 Q The Sakura-kai never meddled in Manchurian
16 problems. You have said that you heard from the late
17 Major General CHO that it did meddle in Manchurian
18 problems, but is this a direct -- did you hear this
19 directly, or is this only hearsay?

20 MR. SACKETT: If the Court please, the
21 prosecution objects to that question. It is argument-
22 ative. He states a proposition and says it is not
23 true and asks the Court -- asks the witness to debate
24 the question. He can ask him directly whether they
25 interfered in Manchuria or were concerned in Manchuria

TANAKA

CROSS

1 or not.

2 THE PRESIDENT: I thought he said he heard
3 from a certain source that they didn't -- well, ask
4 him the question, "Did the Society interfere in
5 Manchuria and who told him it did, if it did so."

6 Q I ask you that question.

7 A Inasmuch as Captain CHO was a central
8 figure in the Sakura-kai and wielded greater in-
9 fluence than Colonel HASHIMOTO in the policies of
10 the organization, I am inclined to believe, give
11 more veracity to what CHO told me.

12 Q Did you say that Major General CHO consulted
13 with HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, concerning Manchurian prob-
14 lems?

15 A According to my memory, CHO has not con-
16 sulted HASHIMOTO on the subject.

17 Q Is the witness aware of the fact that Major
18 General CHO was stationed in China and returned to
19 Japan after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident?

20 A I know that very well.

21 Q Then, even if CHO said that the Sakura-kai
22 concerned itself with Manchurian problems, that would
23 not fall within the scope of CHO's knowledge, would it?

24 A CHO went to China on the first of August.
25 Before his departure for China, however, two incidents

TANAKA

CROSS

1 occurred; the Wanpoashan Incident and the killing of
2 Captain NAKAMURA, Shintaro. At that time CHO as-
3 sembled a group of younger officers at the Kaikosha
4 Officers' Club at Kudan and there spoke very strongly
5 about the need for a quick and decisive settlement
6 of the Manchurian problems. I have heard those words
7 with my own ears. As you say, the Manchurian question
8 was not planned upon very hastily but that it came
9 about after some lapse of time.

10 Q In January of what year did Major General
11 CHO go to China?

12 A I recall it as being the first part of
13 August, 1931.

14 Q Then on what day of what month of what year
15 did the Wanpoashan and NAKAMURA Incidents occur?

16 A My memory is quite good but not quite good
17 enough to answer that question.

18 Q Then I shall tell you. The Wanpoashan
19 Incident occurred in July, 1931. The NAKAMURA Incident
20 occurred on June 28, 1931. These Incidents were taken
21 up as problems in Japan during the latter part of
22 August. Does that refresh your memory?

23 A Then may I be so bold as to ask you whether
24 these problems were taken up and handled by the
25 Foreign Office, the War Office, or by the newspapers?

TANAKA

CROSS

1 If you tell me the correct answer, maybe it would
2 refresh my memory even more.

3 THE MONITOR: As you say, they were taken up
4 in Japan. Do you mean taken up by the War Ministry,
5 or in the reports of the newspapers, or by the
6 Foreign Office. If you will tell me who took up
7 the issue, then I can answer your question.

8 Q Concerning these dates, I made sure at the
9 War Ministry, and even in the newspapers.

10 A Do you know when the Kwantung Army began
11 to handle the Wanpoashan and NAKAMURA Incidents?

12 Q I am not the witness. I am questioning the
13 witness.

14 A But unless I have the answer to that question,
15 I won't be able to reply.

16 Q If you cannot reply, I shall drop that
17 question. Then, what was your relationship with
18 General UGAKI, the supposed leader of the March
19 Incident?

20 A General UGAKI was a superintendent of the
21 Army Staff College which I was attending then. He
22 was a friend of my wife's father. For forty years,
23 almost every day of those forty years, I have listen-
24 ed to the very helpful instructions of General UGAKI
25 and respect him very highly.

1 Q Was General UGAKI an advocate of a reduction
2 in armaments and did he carry out this policy?

3 A General UGAKI was a proponent of the adjust-
4 ment of armaments and carried that policy into effect.

5 Q General ARAKI, who was supposed to become
6 the leader of the October Incident, was he known as
7 a man of the noblest character at the time?

8 A There are various interpretations to the
9 subject of a person's character. Although I cannot
10 say that General ARAKI was a unique figure, I can
11 say that he was a man of high character.

12 Q Had General ARAKI just returned to Tokyo,
13 just been transferred to Tokyo from his post as
14 Commander of the Sixth Division in Kumamoto at the
15 time of the October Incident?

16 A Yes, just as you say.

17 Q Was General ARAKI at that time a man with
18 no connections in central political circles?

19 A Just as you say.

20 Q Are you aware of the fact that as a result
21 of the October Incident HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, was
22 punished and was, furthermore, transferred to be
23 attached to the regiment at Mishima?

24 A I recall that he was punished and attached
25 to the Himeji Regiment but I do not know or recall

TANAKA

CROSS

1 that he was attached to the Mishima Regiment.

2 Q Are you aware of the fact that in the begin-
3 ning of 1932 Colonel SHIGETO of the General Staff
4 Office was transferred to Ranan in Korea?

5 A Yes, I know.

6 Q Also, you have stated that you saw the doc-
7 uments concerning the incident of the bombing of
8 Chang Tso-lin; but has anybody else besides you
9 handled these documents?

10 A I think the present General UMEZU, who was
11 then Chief of the Military Affairs Section in the
12 War Office and the then Minister for War, General
13 SHIRAKAWA, and probably also his Vice-Minister.
14 However, such documents are not permitted to be
15 shown to anybody under the rank of Section Chief
16 without the approval of the Chief of the Military
17 Service Bureau.

18 Q Together with these documents, did you not
19 find a report from General ANDO, the then Chief of
20 the Military Service Bureau on the Liutiaokou Incident
21 together with attached photographs?

22 A Do you mean ANDO, Chief of the Military Ser-
23 vice Bureau?

24 Q A report made by Chief of the Military Ser-
25 vice Bureau ANDO.

TANAKA

CROSS

1 A Was it not ANDO, Chief of the Military
2 Service Section in the Bureau?

3 Q He may have been. He may have been a
4 section chief, anyway, Mr. ANDO.

5 A Since at that time I was not very much
6 interested in the Incident, being a believer in the
7 fact that it was an act of legitimate self-defense,
8 still I presume that such a report exists.

9 THE MONITOR: "Or such a report should exist."
10 A little correction before that: "At that time I
11 believed that the Manchurian Incident was conducted
12 in self-defense as far as Japan was concerned. There-
13 fore I was not interested in such Incident."

14 Q You have stated that in 1928 there was an
15 opinion prevalent that a land of peace, tranquillity
16 and happiness in accordance with the kingly way should
17 be established in Manchuria. Was this opinion the
18 opinion of only Colonel KAWAMOTO or was it shared by
19 the entire TANAKA Cabinet?

20 A I should like to have you understand that
21 this idea was entertained by Colonel KAWAMOTO alone.

22 Q You have stated that in 1928 Colonel KAWAMOTO
23 and in 1930 General ITAGAKI, when you saw and talked
24 with General ITAGAKI, they talked of establishing a
25 land of peace and tranquillity and happiness in

TANAKA

CROSS

1 accordance with the kingly way in Manchukuo. But, was
2 not this phrase used after the establishment of
3 Manchukuo for the first time by the Manchurian
4 leader Yu Chun-han?

5 A These words were often used by those of us
6 Army officers who had connections with China
7 problems.

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TANAKA

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1 Q From around when did you begin to use
2 these words?

3 A These words were used among us from quite a
4 long time ago.

5 Q You have stated that the relations between
6 Japan and Manchuria after 1928 were that of un-
7 declared war. Will you give an example of this?

8 MONITOR: Battle conditions, without dec-
9 laration of war.

10 A One was the construction of a parallel line
11 to the South Manchurian Railway in violation of treaty
12 provisions. If my memory serves me right, there were
13 over three hundred pending issues in Manchuria be-
14 tween China and Japan.

15 Q Then was the solution of the Manchurian
16 problem the solution of these various issues and
17 the establishment of a land of peace, happiness and
18 tranquility, in accordance with the kingly way in
19 Manchuria?

20 A In my understanding, that is what was in-
21 tended by Colonels ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA.

22 Q By "land of peace, tranquility and happiness,
23 in accordance with the kingly way," does this phrase
24 mean a Utopian land of peace without aggression and
25 without war?

TANAKA

CROSS

1 A On the basis of my studies of Chinese
2 affairs, it is exactly as you have just stated.

3 Q Then I shall ask you on another point.
4 You have stated that in August of 1929 a conference
5 of the Chiefs of Staff was held. Upon investigation
6 it was found that no such conference was held. Was
7 this a mistake on your part?

8 A That is an error in memory. I shall correct
9 that. It was in April, 1929.

10 Q Are you aware that there was an important
11 document in the General Staff Office, being a record
12 of the decision on policy made during -- made at con-
13 ferences of this General Staff Office, namely, the
14 estimate of situation?

15 A I know very well, since I have frequently
16 participated in such meetings.

17 MONITOR: In the preparation of such reports.

18 Q Are you aware of the fact that in the
19 estimate of situation for May, 1931, you have pro-
20 posed to the government that for the solution of the
21 Manchurian problem a positive policy must be es-
22 tablished?

23 A Will you repeat that question slowly, please?

24 Q Are you aware of the fact that in May of
25 1931 -- that is the year in which the Manchurian

TANAKA

CROSS

1 Incident broke out -- you have stated in the estimate
2 of situation that a definite policy towards the
3 government must be established in order to solve the
4 Manchurian problem?

5 A I might be reprimanded for saying so, but
6 will you tell me who made the recommendation, the
7 War Office or the General Staff?

8 Q Are you aware of the fact that there is such
9 a notation in the record?

10 A Such recommendations are made every year,,
11 but since I was in Shanghai that year, I do not know
12 about it. Still, I would assume that since it is a
13 custom, such a recommendation was submitted.

14 Q Are you aware that with the outbreak of the
15 Wanpoashan Incident and the Captain NAKAMURI Incident,
16 public opinion in Japan concerning the solution of
17 the Manchurian problem reached the boiling point?

18 A Yes, I know that very well.

19 Q Are you aware that the aggressive actions
20 of the Chinese Army became worse and worse day by
21 day, and that the lives and property of Japanese
22 residents in Manchuria were that of a candle flame
23 in the wind and that matters were such that a single
24 spark would have been sufficient to set off an ex-
25 plosion?

TANAKA

CROSS

1 A You used the word that a single spark would
2 be sufficient to set fire, to cause a conflagration,
3 but I can assure you that the situation was extremely
4 acute.

5 Q Was not the plan of General TATEKAWA and
6 others to solve pending issues between Japan and Man-
7 churia and to establish a **Utopian** land of peace,
8 where there would be no war in Manchuria?

9 A Yes. Exactly as you have just stated.

10 Q Are you aware of the fact that in the
11 Liutiaokou Incident that not a single Chinese, not
12 a single Chinese soldier, was killed by Japanese
13 cannon?

14 A I regret to say I do not know.

15 Q Are you aware of the fact that at the time
16 the Chinese cannons were installed, facing the
17 Japanese garrison in Manchuria, facing the barracks
18 of the Kwantung Army?

19 A That I have heard, but not having been on
20 the spot at that time, I cannot say so categorically.

21 Q Then are you aware that the Chinese cannon
22 began to fire very effectively towards our army at
23 the time?

24 A I think that would be merely a natural
25 result of the fact, since that is natural after a

TANAKA

CROSS

1 war breaks out, or hostilities break out.

2 Q Are you aware of the number of Japanese
3 residents in Manchuria at the time of the breaking
4 out of the Manchurian Incident?

5 A I am aware that there was a great decrease
6 in the number of Japanese residents, but I regret
7 to say that I do not recall the exact figures.

8 Q You do not know even the general figure?

9 A Approximately, yes. I think it was about
10 150,000, which diminished to 100,000. Isn't that so?

11 Q What was the number of Chinese troops in
12 Manchuria at the time?

13 A Since there are no accurate statistics in
14 China, I don't know the exact figures, but from what
15 I have been able to find out as Chief of the Investi-
16 gation Section, the number was approximately 30 million.

17 Q What was the number of the Kwantung Army
18 guarding the South Manchuria railway zone?

19 A It was very small. I should think it was
20 about five or six thousand.

21 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for
22 fifteen minutes.

23 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was
24 taken until 1100, after which the proceedings
25 were resumed as follows, Lanny Miyamoto

TANAKA

CROSS

1 replacing Sho Onodera as Monitor.)

2 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now
3 resumed.

4 Q In one of your answers which you made
5 before the recess I was not able to get its full
6 import. So I shall ask my question again.

7 What was the approximate number of Chinese
8 troops in Manchuria at the time of the Liu-tiao-kou
9 Incident?

10 A Although the main force was stationed
11 principally in the Peking-Tientsin area, I should
12 say that the number of Chinese troops in the three
13 eastern provinces at that time was approximately
14 200,000.

15 Q I want to make sure once again. Was the
16 number of Japanese residents in Manchuria about
17 100,000; the number of the Japanese army in Man-
18 churia about 5,000; the number of the Chinese army
19 in Manchuria, 200,000?

20 A According to my memory, yes.

21 Q Next, in 1933, when the pacification of
22 Jehol had been completed, where were you?

23 A Fourth Infantry Regiment, Osaka, Shinodayama.

24 Q Then, your statement that with the conquest
25 of Jehol the occupation of Manchuria had been

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1 completed is not your own direct testimony but some-
2 thing that you heard from others?

3 A I am speaking from the fact that I have
4 seen documents to that effect when I later became
5 Staff Officer in the Kwantung Army. If you say --
6 I will leave the judgement up to you whether this
7 is hearsay or not.

8 Q Were officials of the Manchurian government
9 in charge of the administrative machinery of Manchukuo?

10 A At that time dual nationality, Japanese and
11 Manchurian.

12 Q Then, would one be a Manchurian official
13 even if one were Japanese by nationality?

14 A They were Manchukuoan officials but at the
15 same time they were of Japanese nationality.

16 Q Then, did all Japanese residents in Man-
17 chukuo have the rights and duties of subjects of
18 Manchukuo as Manchukuoans?

19 A If my recollection is correct, extra-
20 territorial rights prevailed up to 1935 and were
21 gradually withdrawn from that date. And parallel
22 with this, Japanese began to exercise the rights and
23 obligations of Manchukuoans from that date. In 1938,
24 however, extra-territorial rights were completely
25 retroceded, and from that time the Japanese there

TANAKA

CROSS

1 began to assume fully their rights and obligations as
2 Manchukuoan subjects; but they were, at the same time,
3 Japanese nationals.

4 Q Did peace and order in Manchuria become
5 better after the establishment of Manchukuo?

6 A The law and order in Manchuria immediately
7 after the establishment of the State of Manchukuo
8 was extremely bad compared with the pre-Manchukuo
9 establishment date. However, the situation gradually
10 began to improve from 1935. Then, in 1938, the im-
11 provement was very marked and areas, I might say
12 virtually independent areas, which had nothing to do
13 previous to that time with the regime of
14 Chang Hsueh-liang, and also although belonging to
15 the Nanking government had no intercourse with the
16 Nanking government, were absorbed into the State of
17 Manchukuo, and conditions as proved very
18 markedly, according to my recollection.

19 Q Then, what was the policy of the Japanese
20 government which had recognized Manchukuo towards
21 Manchukuo?

22 A Not being a diplomat and having had no con-
23 nections with the handling of treaties, I do not
24 know the details. However, I think that after the
25 recognition of the State of Manchukuo, the Japanese

TANAKA

CROSS

1 government's policy was to foster the development of
2 the new state under Japanese control.

3 THE PRESIDENT: This may possibly go to the
4 question of mitigation of punishment, but it cannot
5 go to the real question of guilt or innocence. We
6 must keep that in mind.

7 Q Next I wish to ask you, did HASHIMOTO,
8 Kingoro, have anything to do with the recognition of
9 Manchukuo by the Japanese government?

10 THE MONITOR: Correction: The policy
11 toward Manchukuo.

12 A According to my recollection, he had abso-
13 lutely no connection whatsoever with the government's
14 policy toward Manchuria.

15 Q Did the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
16 send consuls to Manchuria?

17 A Yes.

18 Q What were your duties as Staff Officer of
19 the Kwantung Army?

20 A My duties as Staff Officer of the Kwantung
21 Army involved operations, especially the geographical
22 survey of the area as well as investigation into
23 the resources of the area, and also to assist the
24 Staff Officer in charge of Espionage; vis-a-vis,
25 China and Mongolia. I being very much versed in

TANAKA

CROSS

1 Chinese and Mongolian affairs, I was also ordered
2 by the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army to
3 help the Staff Officer in charge of Espionage because
4 he was young in his duties. Therefore, I had two
5 duties while attached to the Kwantung Army.

6 Q In executing these duties, did you accept
7 the policies of the Kwantung Army toward Manchukuo
8 and act in accordance with this?

9 A Being a Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army,
10 my duties naturally will have to be in line with that
11 policy.

12 Q When your ideas were not in accordance with
13 those of your superiors, you resigned from the army.
14 When you were a Staff Officer in the Kwantung Army,
15 were your opinions in accordance with the fundamental
16 policy of the Kwantung Army towards Manchukuo?

17 A Being the same, I exerted my utmost efforts.

18 Q Have you ever participated in the China
19 Incident as Chief of Staff of the First Army?

20 A Yes, I did.

21 Q In the plan of operations which you drew up,
22 were there any points which could be regarded as
23 aggressive warfare, or were there not?

24 A To that question I shall reply as follows:
25 Whatever the nation or whatever the people that makes

TANAKA

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1 up this world, there is none that feels that wars are
2 aggressive when it enters upon warfare.

3 Q Then may I understand that your opinions
4 as Chief of Staff of the First Army were identical
5 with the opinions of your superior officers?

6 A The Chief of Staff -- or Chief Staff Officer
7 expresses opposition when opposition is called for
8 but has no authority of execution with regard to
9 plans of operations. It is the duty of the Staff
10 Officer to carry out any plans or orders once they
11 are approved and given by the Commander-in-Chief.

12 Q Were the fundamental policies of yourself,
13 as Chief of Staff, identical with those of your com-
14 mander, or were they not?

15 A The Chief of Staff has opinions but no
16 policy and, therefore, as Staff Officer I cannot say
17 whether I had any opinions with respect to policy.

18 Q When you were Chief of the Military Service
19 Bureau, was it not one of the duties of the Chief of
20 the Military Service Bureau to supervise the military
21 education of young men and students?

22 A The authority rests with the Minister of War,
23 but there are certain rights which are delegated to
24 the Chief. And I exercised my rights as Chief, those
25 delegated rights as Chief of the Military Service

1 Bureau.

2 Q Among the duties delegated to you as Chief
3 of the Military Service Bureau from the War Minister,
4 was there the duty of inciting students to aggressive
5 warfare?

6 A The duty of the Chief of the Military Service
7 Bureau was that of military training. He had no author-
8 ity whatsoever with respect to indoctrination even though
9 he would want to do so. May I emphasize again, I want
10 to say emphatically that the authority to indoctrinate
11 could not be carried out by the Chief of the Bureau
12 even if he wanted to do so.
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1 THE PRESIDENT: The question suggests that
2 students were incited to aggressive warfare. Is
3 there any basis of fact for that?

4 Q Next, as Chief of the Military Service
5 Bureau, was it one of your duties to supervise the
6 gendarmes?

7 A The Chief of the Military Service cannot
8 control or supervise the gendarmes inasmuch as they
9 are under the direct order of command from the War
10 Minister and the Vice War Minister. However, in order
11 to make the supervision over the gendarmes by the War
12 Minister and the Vice Minister for war possible, the
13 Chief of the Military Service Bureau conducted some
14 duties of military administration.

15 Q As Chief of the Military Service Bureau, did
16 you prevent the gendarmes from illegally meddling in
17 politics?

18 A Yes. In assisting the Minister for war, I
19 have done everything possible to prevent such actions
20 although it was not entirely within my authority.

21 Q Have you ever been interviewed by the Inter-
22 national Prosecution Section?

23 A Yes.

24 Q On this occasion, did you receive any inter-
25 rogation concerning the Suiyuan Incident with which

TANAKA

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1 it is supposed that you were connected?

2 A Yes, on three occasions.

3 Q During the course of your interrogations by
4 the International Prosecution Section, were you ever
5 told that if you would not become a witness you would
6 have to be a defendant?

7 THE MONITOR: Correction: Which would you
8 choose, becoming a witness or a defendant?

9 A To this day I have never received threaten-
10 ing words.

11 Q Have you ever written a newspaper article
12 on the request of the International Prosecution
13 Section?

14 A Not by request. I have written articles,
15 but not by request.

16 Q You did write those articles?

17 A Yes, I did, but not by request.

18 Q Was this by the request of the prosecutor
19 who interrogated you or by the request of another
20 prosecutor?

21 MR. SACKETT: If the Court please, the prose-
22 cution objects. The witness has answered that it was
23 not by request.

24 THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
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TANAKA

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1 (At this point a Japanese counsel
2 rose in his place and spoke in Japanese.)

3 THE PRESIDENT: Let us have one translation
4 at a time.

5 A That is not what I said. Let me reply to
6 your question again. I have written articles but
7 not by any request.

8 Q Have you ever helped the International
9 Prosecution Section in its work in any other way?

10 A By the demand of the International Prosecu-
11 tion Section I have daily, to this date, been under
12 investigation and have been asked to cooperate.

13 Q In what way are you cooperating?

14 A If you would read my Curriculum Vitae, you
15 would well understand my background and experience
16 which I owe largely to the goodness of my senior
17 officers, and such experience and background I have
18 been able to gain for myself even though it had been
19 beyond my natural strength and talents. As you have
20 noted in my Curriculum Vitae, I have been Staff
21 Officer of the Kwantung Army, I have been Regimental
22 Commander of the Japanese forces in Ranan, Korea,
23 Chief of the Military Service Section, and Chief of
24 the Military Service Bureau in the Ministry for war.

25 As a result of such background and experience

TANAKA

CROSS

1 I am quite familiar with nearly all the subjects that
2 are under the purview of this Tribunal. Although I
3 cannot say I know the whole truth, I can say very
4 positively that I know the truth to quite a great
5 extent; and, by sharing of this knowledge, I am able
6 to ensure accurate investigation and a fair trial.

7 The investigation of these various matters
8 of which I have spoken is being done by order of the
9 Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, and this
10 investigation is being done in such a way as to limit
11 the scope of the investigation as well as to simplify
12 the method of investigation in order to economize on
13 time.

14 Q Then, from when did you begin to cooperate
15 with the International Prosecution Section in accord-
16 ance with the order of General MacArthur and in
17 accordance with laws?

18 A The order for me to appear before the
19 International Prosecution Section reached me at
20 7:00 a.m. the 4th of February, and I appeared at the
21 International Prosecution Section at nine o'clock the
22 same morning. Since then I was permitted to return
23 to my home in the Fujii mountain area for two weeks.

24 Correction: The 14th of February.

25 THE PRESIDENT: I think we have heard enough

TANAKA

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1 about his cooperation with the prosecution unless
2 there is something very special about his conduct in
3 that regard.

4 Q Then I shall ask you on just one more point:
5 Are you receiving any monetary remuneration for this
6 cooperation?

7 A To this date I have not received one cent
8 as remuneration. I am daily paying twenty-eight sen
9 for my lodging as a witness.

10 MR. HAYASHI: I conclude my cross-examina-
11 tion.

12 LIEUT. LAZARUS: Mr. President, I am
13 Lieutenant Lazarus, counsel for the accused Field
14 Marshal Shunroku HATA. And, although the accused
15 HATA was not mentioned, this witness we believe has
16 some information peculiarly within his own knowledge,
17 sir; and, rather than call him later and take the
18 time of the Tribunal, I respectfully ask the Tribunal's
19 permission to ask him a half dozen questions at this
20 time.

21 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

22 BY LIEUT. LAZARUS:

23 Q General, are you acquainted with the accused
24 Field Marshal Shunroku HATA?

25 A I have been very intimate with him since my

TANAKA

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1 days as Captain.

2 Q In March of 1945, did you discuss with the
3 accused HATA the question of military control over
4 civilians?

5 A Yes.

6 Q General HATA was opposed to military con-
7 trol over civilians, and you agreed with him; isn't
8 that so, sir?

9 A Yes.

10 Q Also at this time, there was a rumor in the
11 press and in the streets that Field Marshal HATA
12 would become the Premier next; isn't that so?

13 A Yes.

14 MR. SACKETT: The prosecution wishes to
15 object, your Honor, because of irrelevance to the
16 issue.

17 THE PRESIDENT: It may be a mitigation of
18 punishment, but isn't that stretching it?

19 LIEUT. LAZARUS: Will you please read the
20 last question to the witness? Oh, he answered
21 "yes." Thank you.

22 Q And when you asked him about this, the
23 accused, Field Marshal HATA, said he would not
24 accept because he does not care to mix in politics,
25 and you told him that you agreed that officers should

TANAKA

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1 not mix in politics; isn't that so, sir?

2 A I shall state my proposition simply as
3 this is a rather different story: When I told His
4 Excellency that "among the young officers there is
5 an opinion that Your Excellency should take con-
6 trol, that martial law should be declared, and
7 that military administration should be put into
8 force, but Your Excellency must not accept this
9 opinion -- this desire on the part of the young
10 officers," His Excellency replied that his greatest
11 ambition was to fulfill his duties as Field Marshal
12 and that he had no desire to become Prime Minister.
13 And, as for declaring martial law, he was absolutely
14 opposed to that as that would split Japan into two.
15 But, he added, he would be in some distress -- he
16 added that he would not know what to do if he should
17 receive an Imperial Command to be Prime Minister.
18 And I told him that "if you should receive such a
19 command, you should decline it immediately," and he
20 replied that he would.

21 LIEUT. LAZARUS: Thank you.

22 MR. YAMADA: I am YAMADA, Hanzo, counsel
23 for the accused ITAGAKI, Seishiro.
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CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY MR. YAMADA:

Q You have stated that the Mukden Incident was planned by the Kwantung Army and especially by ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA as the central figures. Furthermore, you stated that you heard this from OKAWA and HASHIMOTO. But, did you simply hear this from OKAWA and HASHIMOTO, or did you judge that such was the fact from what OKAWA and HASHIMOTO told you, or do you have some other concrete evidence that such a plan actually existed?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think he should be asked to answer again. I will disallow that question.

Q When you speak of "plan," what do you mean?

A Plan is a plan.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness need not answer that.

Q Do you know what was the direct cause of the Liu-tiao-kou Incident which in turn was the cause of the Mukden Incident?

A In my previous statement I have spoken the truth; but, not being a prosecutor nor a defense counsel, I should like to withhold my opinions. But, if you insist, then I should like to turn your

TANAKA

CROSS

1 attention to my affidavit and give your own judgment
2 thereon.

3 Q Have you drawn up an affidavit?

4 A Yes, and signed.

5 Q I want you to give your opinion on the
6 direct cause of the Liu-tiao-kou Incident as you
7 have written it in your affidavit.

8 A The direct cause is the extremely acute
9 situation existing between China and Japan in Man-
10 churia.

11 Q What about the railway explosion? What about
12 the blowing up of the railway?

13 A I think it would be better if I did not
14 reply to that question. My conscience would not
15 permit me to reply to that question.

16 THE PRESIDENT: You had better reply to it.

17 THE WITNESS: I do not know which side blew
18 up the railway, but it was a result of this incident
19 that developed into the Mukden Incident. At that
20 time Japan blamed China for blowing up the railway
21 while China blamed Japan. But, not having the actual
22 data and evidence on hand, my conscience does not
23 permit me to give any reply inasmuch as I do not
24 know where the responsibility lies.

25 Q Are you aware that the government and the

TANAKA

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1 Kwantung Army issued a statement at the time?

2 A Yes, I do. I know because I was Assistant
3 Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy in Shanghai
4 at the time and saw the cables and other documents
5 which came from Tokyo.

6 Q Do the contents of that statement concur
7 with the facts or do they not?

8 A As I have said before, there is no definite
9 and conclusive evidence on the facts, and I cannot
10 say one way or the other. Being a member of the
11 Japanese Army, I have no alternative but to give
12 veracity to the statement that was given out at that
13 time; and, not having been on the spot where the
14 incident occurred, I do not know where the responsi-
15 bility lies for the blowing up of the railway.

16 Q In reply to a question put by counsel
17 HAYASHI you stated that the Liu-tiao-kou Incident
18 was an act of self defense.

19 A I did not say that it was an act of self
20 defense, but I said --

21 THE PRESIDENT: This is a convenient break.
22 We will adjourn until half-past one.

23 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was
24 taken.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION

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3 The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at
4 1330.

5 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International
6 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

7 THE PRESIDENT: Let the doctor's certificate
8 I read this morning be recorded, Mr. Bowman.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Before the recess counsel
10 made the following statement: "In reply to a question
11 by counsel HAYASHI you stated that the Lix-tiao-kou
12 Incident was an act of self-defense."

13 To that the witness replied: "I did not say
14 that it was an act of self-defense; I only said that
15 I had believed at that time that it was."

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1 R Y U K I C H I T A N A K A , called as a witness
2 on behalf of the prosecution, resumed the stand
3 and testified as follows:

4 BY MR. YAMADA (Continued)

5 Q Continuing the morning's cross-examination,
6 I ask you: You have said that in connection with the
7 Liu-tiao-kou Incident that the Chief of the Military
8 Service Bureau, ANDO, may have submitted reports and
9 photographs, but that as you believe it was an act
10 of self-defense you had no interest in them. On
11 what basis did you think that it was an act of self-
12 defense?

13 A By self-defense, it means, in my interpre-
14 tation, an action taken by a nation when in extreme
15 difficulties with the aim toward freeing itself from
16 that situation. The international law interpretation
17 of that term may be different, but you would know that.

18 Q Then do you believe that the Liu-tiao-kou
19 Incident was an act of self-defense?

20 A Up to the termination of the Pacific War,
21 I believed, as the Japanese national advocated, that
22 it was an act of self-defense; that is, because I am
23 a Japanese and I believed as my government said.
24 However, whether it was an act of self-defense or not
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1 depends upon the decision of this Court. At this
2 present moment I cannot myself say which. I am a-
3 waiting the judgment of the Court.

4 Q Have you ever read the Lytton report?

5 A No.

6 Q You have never seen it?

7 A No. However, I have seen fragments of that
8 report in magazines.

9 Q The witness has testified that immediately
10 before the Manchurian Incident, the situation between
11 the Japanese and Chinese armies in Manchuria was very
12 tense, and that there were about -- there were over
13 three hundred pending issues between the two countries,
14 and that among them one of the principal was the
15 Nakamura Incident.

16 Q Do you remember any other great incident
17 which helped to worsen the situation; can you give
18 four or five examples?

19 A You mean by that that you include the
20 Nakamura Incident and the Wan Pow Shun Incident?

21 Q Are there any other incidents besides these
22 two incidents?

23 A I think I am correct in saying that accord-
24 ing to the Japan-China Treaty, entered into in 1904,
25 a parallel line was not to be established -- that is

TANAKA

CROSS

1 parallel to the South Manchurian Railway. I think
2 that China ignored Japan's treaty rights with respect
3 to the construction of parallel lines. I think parallel
4 lines were constructed to the east of the SMR -- South
5 Manchurian Railway -- as well as the south.

6 THE MONITOR: Correction: One line to the
7 east and one line to the west of the Manchurian Rail-
8 way.

9 A (Continuing) If my memory serves me right,
10 at the time of the projected construction of the
11 Kirin-Kainei Railway, capital was to be invested by
12 Japan in accordance with the Five-Power or the Four-
13 Power consortium, but this plan was obstructed and
14 the plan was not realized. There were many other
15 disputes and incidents at that time, but because of
16 the lapse of time my memory will not permit me to speak
17 definitely or positively. However, I definitely re-
18 call that ever since Chang Hsueh-liang brought the
19 national flag of China into Manchuria, the situation
20 became extremely -- the anti-Japanese situation in
21 Manchuria became extremely acute. The principal ob-
22 jective of the anti-Japanese movement was the retro-
23 cession of Port Arthur and Dairen and the return of
24 the South Manchurian Railway.

25 Q Are you not aware of the fact that Japanese

TANAKA

CROSS

1 primary school children had to have guards in order
2 to attend school because of persecution by Chinese
3 civilians and officials, and in some places they were
4 not able to attend school at all, and that in other
5 ways anti-Japanese movements -- anti-Japanese move-
6 ments became very wide-spread?

7 A Yes, I do recall that there were many in-
8 cidents similar to that which you said -- you have
9 just mentioned -- which occurred as a by-product of
10 the larger anti-Japanese movement.

11 Q Are you aware of the fact that at that time
12 a stone was placed on the rails outside of Mukden in
13 an attempt to overturn the train?

14 A Yes.

15 Q Then have you ever heard that when the
16 Japanese army attempted to carry out maneuvers out-
17 side of Mukden, the Chinese army would carry out
18 maneuvers that very day, on that very spot, and would
19 thus obstruct the Japanese army?

20 A There is no such fact in my recollection.

21 Q Are you aware -- you have testified this
22 morning that the strength of Chinese forces in Man-
23 churia was over two hundred thousand, but are you
24 aware that they were stationed in Chung Ching, Mukden,
25 Kan-chintsu, and elsewhere?

TANAKA

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1 A That fact I know better than you. However,
2 I must say that the Chinese troops were in their
3 barracks, and not outside of them.

4 THE MONITOR: And they were not in the
5 Japanese settlement -- area.

6 Q Addition to the previous question: And
7 Kun-chu-ling.

8 In short, was not the situation between
9 Japanese and Chinese troops such that there was
10 imminent danger of a clash?

11 A That is why I told Prosecutor Sackett, in
12 my narration on the situation existing immediately
13 before the outbreak of the Mukden Incident, that it
14 was a state of hostilities without a declaration of
15 war.

16 Q Turning to another aspect: You stated that
17 you met ITAGAKI at Port Arthur in June, 1930. What
18 was your mission in going to Port Arthur at that time?

19 A In April of that year General HATA, Shunroku,
20 then Major General, was at the head of a tour, consist-
21 ing of staff officers, to Manchuria. At that time I
22 became a party to the entourage. This tour ended
23 toward the end of May that year, but continuing there-
24 after I made a trip to the Hsingam-Mon Mountains in
25 order to prepare for another trip there, and at that

1 time I went to Port Arthur, where I stayed for one
2 week. During that visit of one week I was a guest of
3 ITAGAKI at his official residence for two days. I
4 was then -- when I made that statement I was speak-
5 ing of this meeting.

6 Q At that time did you see only ITAGAKI, or
7 did you also see General ISHIHARA?

8 A I met all the staff officers of the Kwantung
9 Army.

10 Q Did you have a discussion with all these
11 staff officers?

12 A Yes, we drank sake and discussed also.

13 Q Then, was this Manchukuoan problem discussed
14 at a drinking party?

15 A Yes, over cups of sake as well as in the
16 offices of the general staff officer. It was a matter
17 of common knowledge and practice for we staff officers
18 of the Kwantung Army, who were versed in China affairs,
19 to discuss the relationships -- the relations between
20 Japan and China in Manchuria.

21 Q Then, did your judgment -- that ITAGAKI was
22 planning something concerning the Manchurian problem --
23 arise out of this discussion that you held at that time?

24 A To that question I should think I should not
25 reply any further.

THE PRESIDENT: You should reply.

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1 A On the year before that I terminated my
2 stay in Peiping where I was stationed and returned to
3 Japan by way of Manchuria. I think that was in the
4 middle of August, 1929. Japanese-Chinese relations
5 in Manchuria at that time was daily becoming aggravated
6 and acute as a result of the killing of Marshal Chang
7 Tso-lin and the bringing of the flag of the Chinese
8 Republic to Manchuria by Chang Hsueh-liang.

9 We officers, who were concerned with China
10 affairs, entertained the belief that if such a situa-
11 tion were to continue, the problems then pending could
12 not be settled by peaceful means. Under such a situa-
13 tion we would not know when the Japanese and Chinese
14 armies would clash. Hence, if such a clash should ever
15 arise, it was our belief that we would have to suppress
16 it and we would have to punish them thoroughly. As a
17 result, the hostilities might spread to all parts of
18 Manchuria. It was, therefore, imperative that a very
19 detailed investigation of Manchuria should be made now
20 more than ever before. However, for this purpose, the
21 present efficiency, personnel and strength of the
22 Investigation Section of the Kwantung Army would not
23 be enough in probing into the resources of Manchuria,
24 the sentiments of the people and other important informa-
25 tion. As a result of this there was a great deal of

TANAKA

CROSS

1 hope presented to me, then Major TANAKA, that if I
2 should return to the General Staff in Tokyo, I should
3 make every effort possible to enlarge the China
4 Investigation Division of our Army.

5 THE MONITOR: China and Manchurian Investiga-
6 tion Section.

7 (Continuing) However, when I returned to the
8 General Staff Office in Tokyo, I discovered that the
9 China-Manchurian Investigation Section was under the
10 jurisdiction of the Horse Administration Section of
11 the War Ministry and, therefore, I had a talk with the
12 Chief of this section, Colonel HARA, Suenari.

13 To develop the China-Manchurian Research
14 Section into a general investigation section was a very
15 delicate and complicated question, inasmuch as it would
16 give rise to conflict between different branches within
17 the Army. However, it being the ardent desire of my
18 respected senior officers that I succeed in my efforts,
19 I finally surmounted all difficulties and succeeded in
20 creating a general investigation section on the first
21 of April, 1929 -- 1930.

22 However, when I returned again to Manchuria
23 the following June, I found that the situation between
24 Japan and China in Manchuria was even more acute and
25 that the administration of the Mukden warlords was of

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1 such a character and quality that the livelihood of
2 the people as well as the general economic situation
3 was in a very distressing condition; and, therefore,
4 I recall that it was the feeling at that time that
5 these Chinese -- Manchurian warlords should be over-
6 thrown, driven out and that a new regime of peace and
7 order according to the kingly way be established.

8 THE MONITOR: Slight correction: "Therefore,
9 in June when we met I believe this was the reason that
10 the topic was turned to the question of the land of
11 peace" and so on and so on, "according to the kingly
12 way."

13 A (Continuing) That is all.

14 Q You have stated that ITAGAKI is your benefactor.
15 How did he become your benefactor?

16 A Will it be all right if I started on that
17 subject? It will take a long time.

18 Q Please state it briefly.

19 THE PRESIDENT: I do not think he should spend
20 much time on it. He set out, as I understood the
21 position, to link up ITAGAKI with what he has already
22 said, but the link has not been shown yet.

23 A (Continuing) When I entered the Military
24 Academy as an officer cadet, ITAGAKI was a section
25 leader in my company. During my student days at the

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1 Academy, I was somewhat of the very mischievous
2 type--

3 THE PRESIDENT: I do not think we want to hear
4 that. I do not think we want to go into those details.
5 I am sure no member of this Court does.

6 Q Is ITAGAKI a man of such a character as
7 would plan a conspiracy?

8 THE PRESIDENT: That is too general. We
9 cannot allow questions like that.

10 Q Are you aware of the fact that when you were
11 in Manchukuo in each district of Manchuria there were
12 secret service stations?

13 THE MONITOR: The term is "special service
14 organization" of the Kwantung Army.

15 A (Continuing) Yes, they were in the important
16 cities of Manchuria, not in districts.

17 Q Are you aware of the fact that these special
18 service organizations were dissolved because they inter-
19 fered too much with matters of personnel of the Man-
20 churian Government?

21 A In line with the policy of the Deputy Chief
22 of Staff ITAGAKI, it was I who am responsible for
23 preventing, stopping the special service section of
24 the Army to interfere into such matters; but the
25 organization itself was not abolished.

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1 THE MONITOR: Slight correction: "In line
2 with the policy of Vice Chief of Staff ITAGAKI and
3 Chief of Staff TOJO, it was I who was instrumental
4 in preventing the special service organization to
5 meddle in the political affairs. However, the special
6 service organization itself was not dissolved."

7 A (Continuing) In spite of the fact that
8 there was great opposition to this step, success was
9 achieved in convincing the other staff officers of the
10 necessity and wisdom of this step just before his
11 Excellency TOJO returned from --

12 That statement will be repeated again.

13 In spite of the very big opposition given to
14 this step, success was achieved in convincing the
15 staff officers of the Kwantung Army of the wisdom and
16 need for this step in 1938 just before his Excellency
17 TOJO returned from a conference of the Chiefs of Staff.

18 This policy was established by ITAGAKI when
19 he was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, but the
20 person who very vigorously carried out this policy
21 was his successor, General TOJO.

22 With reference to the settlement of this
23 question, I received from General ITAGAKI when I became
24 Division Commander of the Hiroshima Division a very
25 courteous letter of thanks.

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1 Q Are you aware of the fact that ITAGAKI
2 as far as was possible tried to stop officers under
3 him and tried to stop his subordinates from inter-
4 fering in the politics of the Manchurian Government?

5 A Yes, of that fact I am perhaps more familiar
6 than anybody else.

7 Q During your term of office -- during your
8 stay in Manchuria, the Japanese Government in recom-
9 mending officials to serve in the Manchurian Government
10 did so only upon the recommendation of the Manchurian
11 Government; and if there was no demand and the Kwan-
12 tung Army did not recommend officials without -- if
13 there was no demand on the part of the Manchurian
14 Government?

15 THE MONITOR: Clarification of that: "During
16 your tenure of office, isn't it true that the recom-
17 mendation of the Japanese Government officials was
18 done only by request, only when there was a request
19 from Manchukuo; and isn't it also true that the Kwan-
20 tung Army did not recommend any Japanese Government
21 official unless there was a request?
22

23 A Yes, insofar as the form was concerned,
24 that was so. Actually speaking, it was not so. It
25 is my recollection that the younger officers were
then very restive and aggressive, that they would not

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1 always submit to the policy maintained by their
2 senior officers.

3 Q Concerning the appointment of Manchurian
4 officials in the Manchukuo Government who comprised
5 the greater part of the officials of that Government,
6 is it not a fact that in principle the Kwantung Army
7 did not interfere in their appointment also?

8 A Actually, the procedure was such as you say,
9 but, actually speaking, that is, in the enforcement of
10 this policy, that was not followed.

11 THE MONITOR: It was exactly opposite.

12 A (Continuing) The reason for this was that
13 if personnel questions were left in the hands of
14 officials of the Japanese nationality, more cliquish-
15 ness and other sectionalism would occur and disturb
16 the orderly procedure of government administration than
17 if the Kwantung Army should have some say.

18 Q What was the most important policy towards
19 Manchuria during the time General ITAGAKI was Chief of
20 Staff?

21 THE PRESIDENT: I think that is too general.
22 I don't think we would get any help from the answer.
23 Think of another question.

24 A It was the retrocession of extra-territorial
25 rights.

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1 Q Are you aware of the fact that during the time
2 General ITAGAKI was Chief of Staff, the retrocession
3 of extra-territoriality and the return of the railway
4 zone were carried out?

5 A If my recollection is correct, this was
6 planned, studied and recommended at the time ITAGAKI
7 was Chief of Staff; but the plan was put into execution
8 at the time TOJO was Chief of Staff.

9 Q Was this carried out in order to benefit the
10 Japanese people or was it not?

11 MR. SACKETT: To which the prosecution
12 objects, your Honor, for the reason it is irrelevant
13 to the issue -- whether it benefitted them or not --
14 collateral.

15 INTERPRETER: The witness said the purpose
16 was to get rid of the Japanese superiority complex in
17 order to permit -- in order to have the Japanese live
18 with the inhabitants of Manchuria on an equal basis.

19 THE PRESIDENT: I think you have completed
20 your cross-examination. You seem to be thinking for
21 further questions.

22 Q Turning to another aspect, I wish to ask you
23 on another point. Is it not true that officers on the
24 active list cannot resign even if they have opposing
25 opinions unless they be sick?

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1 A Yes, as you say.

2 Q Did you write a book called, "An Expose of
3 the Military Clique?"

4 A I have not written a book on that subject,
5 "Expose of the Military Clique."

6 THE MONITOR: Correction: "I did not write a
7 book entitled, 'Expose of the Military Clique.' I
8 wrote a book on the causes -- an expose on the causes
9 of defeat."

10 Q Are what you have written there facts?

11 A What part of the book are you referring to?

12 Q All of it. What you have written in this book,
13 are they facts, are they true?

14 A I need not quote my preface in that book
15 but if you would read it over, you would understand
16 that it was my purpose to tell the truth.

17 Q One other point. Are you aware of the fact
18 fact that when the state of Manchukuo was founded, an
19 outstanding character in Manchuria was -- became the
20 committee member for the establishment of this new
21 state?

22 A Yes, very well.

23 Q What kind of people were the principal
24 leaders -- participants in this committee?

25 A Well, of course, if you want me to quote --

TANAKA

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1 to speak of some Japanese dignitaries, I could; but
2 some of them are not necessarily dignitaries from the
3 Chinese point of view and there is not necessarily
4 any agreement between Japanese and Chinese as to who
5 happened to be great personages. But, if you ask me
6 for who was a member of great character I would say
7 Yu Chung-han.

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1 MR. OHTA: I am OHTA, Kinjiro, counsel for
2 the defendant DOHIHARA.

3 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

4 BY MR. OHTA:

5 Q In your testimony day before yesterday, you
6 stated that DOHIHARA was an adviser of the Hopeh-Chahar
7 Council. Did you not make a mistake in your memory?

8 A He may have been an adviser and he may have
9 remained in Peking without being an adviser. On that
10 point I should rather leave the answer to the inter-
11 rogator inasmuch as I cannot make a positive answer.

12 Q Then, in order to make the fact clear, I
13 shall say something, so please reply to that. Do
14 you recall that the Hopeh-Chahar Regime was established
15 on December 14, 1935?

16 A Are you referring to the date when the
17 ceremony for the creation of this regime was held?
18 Inasmuch as those of us on the spot recall the
19 actual facts, I should say that this was held toward
20 the end of November.

21 Q You stated in your testimony that DOHIHARA
22 became commander of the First Depot Division in
23 March of 1936, but were not the facts as follows:
24 that in the middle of February he was advanced to
25 the rank of lieutenant general and attached to the

TANAKA

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1 Twelfth Division but that as a result of the February
2 26th Incident he was suddenly transferred to the First
3 Depot Division?

4 A Yes, I recall now that you said so.

5 Q Then wasn't your testimony that DOHARA
6 returned in order to report to the Commander-in-Chief
7 MINAMI on the establishment of the Hopeh-Chahar
8 Regime also mistaken and wasn't this report made
9 toward the end of December of the previous year?

10 A According to my memory he returned twice,
11 once the end of November, and the second time the
12 end of December.

13 Q Then do you admit that even during this
14 brief period it was impossible that DOHARA should
15 have been adviser to the Hopeh-Chahar Political
16 Council since for an officer on the active list to
17 take up such a post it would be necessary not only to
18 receive permission from the Commander-in-Chief of the
19 Kwantung Army, but also through Central Army Head-
20 quarters Imperial permission also was required?

21 A Yes.

22 Q Next I will ask you, you have stated that the
23 DOHARA-Chin To Chun Treaty was concluded after the
24 establishment of the Hopeh-Chahar Regime, but is it
25 not a fact that that treaty, that agreement was

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1 concluded on June 23, 1935 before the establishment
2 of this regime.

3 MONITOR: Slight correction: before the
4 establishment of the Hopeh-Chahar Political Committee,
5 not regime.

6 A You are possibly referring to the date on
7 which the signing of the agreement was held, but if
8 my memory is correct the promise was made on December
9 31 of the year 1935 when Chin Te Chun came to the
10 Great Wall line with three cavalry divisions from
11 Mongolia and I was in charge of fostering Mongolia
12 at that time.

13 Q That is my memory of the case, but what was
14 the date you mentioned previously?

15 A I said June 23, 1935.

16 Q 1935?

17 A Aren't you making a mistake between this and
18 the UMEZU-Ho Yiang-chin Agreement?

19 Q My statement is not a mistake. 1935.

20 A In June, Chin Te Chun was not yet in Peiping.

21 Q Then this is what I have told you so far
22 what General DOHIHARA himself said, but what about
23 DOHIHARA's relations with the Hopeh-Chahar Regime --
24 Political Council?

25 THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether the

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1 witness can follow that question, but I cannot. Let
2 the witness answer it. He may understand it.

3 A I will leave that to your own judgment.

4 Q What were the purposes of the Hopeh-Chahar
5 Political Committee?

6 A To cooperate with Japan as a means to keep
7 out communisim and also to establish intimate relations
8 with Manchukuo; also to maintain intimate relationship
9 with Japan. It was also to control and advise in
10 the political, economic, and military affairs of
11 that area in accordance with Japanese desire, if
12 that was at all possible, without infringing upon
13 Chinese Sovereignty.

14 MONITOR: That does not infringe upon
15 Chinese Sovereignty.

16 Q Next, was there any cause which made it
17 imperative that the Hopeh-Chahar Political Committee
18 be established?

19 A I have made my statement on that very clear
20 the day before yesterday in the interrogation con-
21 ducted by Prosecutor Sackett.

22 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess now for
23 fifteen minutes.

24 (Whereupon, at 1445, a recess was
25 taken until 1500, after which the proceedings

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1 were resumed as follows, Lanny Miyamoto
2 replacing Sho Onodera as Monitor.)

3 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The Tribunal is now
4 resumed.

5 BY MR. OHTA (Continuing):

6 Q The other day you talked of some of the pur-
7 poses of the Hopeh-Chahar Political Council. But you
8 did not tell us of the causes of this Hopeh-Chahar
9 regime, why this Hopeh-Chahar Political Council had
10 to be. Will you tell us of this now?

11 A Since the independence of Manchuria, it was
12 the principal national policy of the national govern-
13 ment at Nanking to recover lost territories, partly
14 by diplomatic means, partly by force of arms. It was
15 for the purpose of abolishing or preventing friction
16 between Japan and China that a plan was considered to
17 create south of the Great Wall an area where Japanese-
18 Chinese good will would prevail.

19 Q In short, was not the purpose of the estab-
20 lishment of this committee to stave off a rupture of
21 relations between Japan and China and to establish
22 peace in some way or another?

23 A From the practical point of view, peace was
24 established between Japan and China with the Tangku
25 troops. From what I know there were people within

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1 the Kuomintang regime who very much disfavored any
2 friction or controversy or conflict with Japan or
3 anywhere in Asia. However, the anti-Japanese resist-
4 ance movement and sentiment among the youthful mem-
5 bers of the Kuomintang and students did not decrease
6 by any means. However, if some area in North China
7 were to be separated from the Nanking government that
8 would mean that the influence of that regime in that
9 particular area would be so weakened that friction
10 between Japan and China in that area would be greatly
11 lessened. For the purpose of lessening friction
12 between Japan and China, for the purposes of peace,
13 no. But it would have sufficient strength to prevent
14 conflict. Viewing the objective situation between
15 China and Japan at that time, no formal peace was
16 possible. As a matter of fact, the relationship between
17 the two countries was being more seriously aggravated.

18 Q Then I ask the witness, in the final analysis
19 was not the purpose of the establishment of this
20 Council the establishment of peace?

21 A I will leave that to your judgment on the
22 basis of this fact that no people, wherever they are,
23 no people are not desirous of peace.

24 MR. OHTA: That concludes my cross-examination.

25 MR. T. OKAMOTO: I am OKAMOTO, Toshio, coun-

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1 sel for the defendant MINAMI, Jiro.

2 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Continued)

3 BY MR. T. OKAMOTO:

4 Q Since, Mr. Witness, you seem to have a lot
5 of opinions, would you answer to my question simply
6 yes or no.

7 MR. SACKETT: If the Court please, in my
8 experience in cross-examination the witness is not
9 required to simply answer yes or no, but is given
10 permission to explain briefly his answer of yes or
11 no. I would like to see that procedure followed here.

12 MR. T. OKAMOTO: You may give simple expla-
13 nations to your answers.

14 Q When did you first see General MINAMI?

15 THE MONITOR: Correction: What year.

16 A The first time I met General MINAMI was in
17 the year 1924 when the grand military maneuvers were
18 conducted near Kawagoe, at which time I was on the
19 Staff. General MINAMI at that time served as a
20 judge and reprimanded us very severely because of the
21 poor showing that was made.

22 Q I understand. Have you been intimate with
23 him ever since?

24 A Yes.

25 Q You have stated in the course of the direct

TANAKA

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1 examination that while you were a Staff Officer
2 attached to the Kwantung Army you heard from General
3 MINAMI, the Commander-in-Chief of the army, his
4 recollections of the Manchurian Incident.

5 What year and what month did you hear these
6 recollections?

7 A Since my days in the military prep school
8 I have never kept a diary so I do not remember the
9 date.

10 Q You have always stated the correct date very
11 exactly whenever you were questioned by the prose-
12 cution. May I understand that you do not remember
13 the exact date of General MINAMI's recollections?

14 A On that point I stated to Mr. Sackett, the
15 assistant prosecutor, that this meeting with General
16 MINAMI took place sometime in the Fall of 1935. Now,
17 I told Mr. Sackett whenever I knew any date definitely
18 I told him that, gave him that date definitely; when-
19 ever I did not recall I said so. I am not deliberately
20 withholding anything from you.

21 Q Then, where did you hear these recollections?

22 A I remember the place very definitely. It
23 was in the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the
24 Kwantung Army.

25 Q Was this on the occasion of an official visit--

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1 when you went to him in the course of an official
2 duty?

3 A Nowhere in the world is there any presen-
4 tation of memoirs when in the course of official
5 duties.

6 Q Then, did you see him on a private matter?

7 A It was after an official interview had been
8 concluded that such recollections were told me.

9 Q Was there somebody else there present besides
10 you?

11 A No.

12 Q What section of the general staff office of
13 the Kwantung Army were you attached to?

14 A Second Section, Kwantung Army.

15 Q Who was your immediate superior?

16 A Colonel KAWABE, Torashiro, of the Artillery.

17 Q Who was the immediate superior of the Chief
18 of the Second Section?

19 A Major General ITAGAKI, Seishiro, Assistant
20 Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army.

21 Q Who was the immediate superior of the Assis-
22 tant Chief of Staff?

23 A Lieutenant General NISHIO, Toshizo, Commander-
24 in-Chief, Kwantung Army -- no, Chief of Staff, Kwan-
25 tung Army.

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1 Q Then I feel it is rather difficult to believe
2 that a mere staff officer would be able to talk with
3 General MINAMI who was Commander-in-Chief of the
4 Kwantung Army, and Ambassador to Manchukuo as well,
5 in his own private room.

6 A It might be quite difficult for you to
7 imagine this, but as a matter of fact, at that time
8 we were in the midst of planning out our North China
9 policy and all cables coming in from General DOHIHARA
10 and all cables sent out to General DOHIHARA were being
11 handled by me. Most of the important messages could
12 not be handled without the previous approval of the
13 Commander-in-Chief. Unlike other unit commanders,
14 a staff officer can always see his Commander-in-Chief
15 in case of important business.

16 Q I understand. Did General MINAMI tell you
17 of all his recollections of the Manchurian Incident
18 in one sitting?

19 A Yes.

20 Q Then, you say that besides this visit as
21 Staff Officer, you were able to see the Commander-
22 in-Chief directly any time you wanted to. Then you
23 have seen him on many other occasions also, have you
24 not?

25 A Yes, I had many opportunities to meet him

TANAKA

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1 and talk with him.

2 Q Then on these occasions as well as when you
3 visited him on official duties it is possible that
4 General MINAMI talked to you on Japanese policies
5 towards Manchuria?

6 A Concerning the Japanese policy towards Man-
7 churia, that was already established by treaty pro-
8 visions.

9 Q I am not asking you about that. I am asking
10 you about General MINAMI. Is that reply saying that
11 with respect to General MINAMI's policy with respect
12 to Manchuria, you will not reply to that?

13 A The Second Section of the Kwantung Army has
14 nothing to do with the politics of Manchuria. Those
15 matters are dealt with by the Third Section of the
16 Kwantung Army.

17 Q Then the witness does not know about the pol-
18 icy regarding the internal guidance of Manchukuo?

19 A The principle for the inner guidance of
20 Manchurian affairs is fixed. That cannot be changed
21 or modified by the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung
22 Army alone.

23 Q Then your reply is that the question of --
24 regarding General MINAMI's relation to the guidance
25 of the inner affairs of Manchukuo is not concerned with

TANAKA

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General MINAMI himself?

1 A Yes. That is not General MINAMI's authority.

2 Q Then the witness does not recall that General
3 MINAMI's responsibility with respect to Manchuria was
4 the preservation of peace?

5 A The preservation of law and order in Man-
6 churia is not a concern of the Commander-in-Chief
7 alone, but also his Chief of Staff, Vice-Chief of
8 Staff and other staff officers.

9 Q Do you not recall that General MINAMI espec-
10 ially advocated this point?

11 A If my memory is not too faint, I think he
12 issued instructions to that effect once.

13 Q With respect to the preservation of law and
14 order, was it not that army personnel should not
15 interfere in political affairs?

16 THE MONITOR: Respecting the independence of
17 Manchuria.

18 A At the time His Excellency General MINAMI
19 took over the office of Commander-in-Chief, the state
20 of law and order in Manchuria was extremely bad and
21 it was as a matter of course that the recovery and
22 the maintenance of law and order was his foremost
23 task. There is a very great difference between inter-
24 ference and inner guidance. It is natural not to
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1 interfere. But as to pulling the strings, as it were,
2 that is a separate question.
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1 Q Does the witness recall that there was a
2 special service unit in the Kwantung Army?

3 A Yes.

4 Q What type of work was this unit engaged in?

5 A The object was to train the Manchukuoan
6 Army to maintain law and order in Manchukuo and, when
7 need arises, to fight for the defense of Manchukuo.

8 Q Do you know that General MINAMI abolished
9 this special service unit?

10 A Previously I thought you referred to the
11 military department. If it's the special service
12 department, I have another answer.

13 Q I meant the special service department.

14 Then, could you please explain where and
15 what type of work the special service department was
16 engaged in?

17 A When I first went to the Kwantung Army, it
18 was immediately after the special service department
19 was abolished. At that time, within the Kwantung
20 Army, the regular officers were actively engaged in
21 participating in economic and political affairs.

22 Q Then, is this not true: that the reason
23 General MINAMI abolished this special service depart-
24 ment was because regular army officers should not
25 indulge in politics?

TANAKA

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1 A Yes. Immediately after General MINAMI's
2 arrival to take over the post of Commander-in-Chief,
3 he immediately abolished this special service de-
4 partment in order to remove the evils of the prac-
5 tice of meddling in politics inasmuch as he felt
6 that it would lead to the corruption of the army
7 itself.

8 Q Then you know that at this time the abolish-
9 ment of extra-territoriality in Manchuria and the
10 transfer of administrative rights south of the Man-
11 churian zone was in its first step at this time?

12 A Regarding this decision, General MINAMI
13 took the first decisive step.

14 Q Did General MINAMI ever move the Kwantung
15 Army outside of the borders of Manchuria during his
16 tenure of office as Commander-in-Chief of the Kwan-
17 tung Army?

18 A Two brigades were sent to the demilitarized
19 zone south of the Great Wall, but this was in accord-
20 ance with treaty provisions -- that is, the Tangku
21 Truce. It was not a violation of any treaty commit-
22 ments.

23 Another occasion is when, during the program
24 to set up the Hopeh-Chahar Regime, two battalions
25 of cavalry were sent out from Cheng Do to Dolan Nor

TANAKA

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1 in Chahar.

2 Q From what month of what year to what month
3 of what year were these forces sent out?

4 A Although my mind is not very good, I re-
5 call that one month after the conclusion of the
6 UMEZU-Ho Ying-chin Agreement, one armored brigade
7 and one mixed regiment was sent from Cheng Do in
8 Jehol into the demilitarized zone for about one
9 month. All these troop movements were based on
10 treaty provisions.

11 Q Did these forces withdraw after a short
12 period of time?

13 A Yes. These troops immediately returned to
14 their posts after their mission had been concluded.

15 Q You say these troops were sent to Inner
16 Mongolia. When was this?

17 A In December, 1935.

18 Q Was this not in connection with the
19 incident known as the Incident of the Sixth Hsien
20 of North Cháhar?

21 A Isn't there a mistake? I do not recall
22 such an incident.

23 Q Then, you have no definite information
24 that these two armored brigades did go -- armored
25 battalions did go into Chahar, do you?

TANAKA

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1 A Yes. As Staff Officer of the Kwantung
2 Army I went to Dolan Nor by airplane and stayed
3 there a week, so I witnessed this with my own eyes.

4 Q When did these two battalions withdraw?

5 A These two battalions withdrew after two weeks
6 from the Sixth Hsien of North Chahar after the Mon-
7 golian Army had withdrawn.

8 THE MONITOR: Mongolian Cavalry.

9 Q Who was the leader of Chahar at that time --
10 the leader or, rather I should say, the most important
11 personage in Chahar?

12 A Until the agreement was concluded between
13 General DOHIHARA and Chin teh-ching, the leading
14 figure was General Sung Che-yuan. However, after the
15 agreement was concluded, the most powerful leader
16 in that area was Teh yuan or Prince Teh.

17 Q Do you recall the fact that this Prince Teh
18 visited Hsinking?

19 A Yes.

20 Q When was this?

21 A I think it was in the -- toward the end of
22 August, 1935, if my memory is not mistaken.

23 Q Was it in December that those two battalions
24 were sent to Chahar?

25 A Teh yuan went to Hsinking in August, 1935.

TANAKA

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1 But, as to these two battalions, I was mistaken; it
2 was the latter part of August, 1936.

3 Q I believe the interpretation of the present
4 question was somewhat confused. I shall ask you
5 again: Did Prince Teh visit Hsinking before or
6 after the battalions were sent into Inner Mongolia?

7 A It was four months before, if my memory
8 is not mistaken.

9 Q You mean to say then, that Prince Teh came
10 before. In your testimony you have stated that,
11 on the order of General MINAMI, you and Colonel
12 ISHIMOTO of the Second Section of the Kwantung Army
13 went to see Prince Teh. When was this?

14 A The end of April, 1935, or the first part
15 of May, 1935.

16 Q What Second Section Chief is this Colonel
17 ISHIMOTO?

18 A Naturally, the Kwantung Army.

19 Q Did you just not state that the Chief of
20 the Second Section of the Kwantung Army was Colonel
21 KAWABE, Torashiro?

22 A Colonel ISHIMOTO was transferred to the
23 General Staff in Tokyo in August, 1935, and his
24 successor was KAWABE, Torashiro.

25 Q You have stated that Colonel ISHIMOTO had

TANAKA

CROSS

1 in his possession the instructions from General
2 MINAMI. Can you say with any confidence whether
3 Colonel ISHIMOTO actually had these instructions or
4 not?

5 A Naturally, inasmuch as the Section Chief
6 cannot cross the border without official instruc-
7 tions on so important a business.

8 Q But, did not Colonel ISHIMOTO go to Inner
9 Mongolia -- go to Chahar because Prince Teh had
10 asked for him?

11 A No. At that time the situation was thus:
12 At the estate of Prince Teh there was a small special
13 service organ, and this special service organ frequent-
14 ly suggested this project to the Prince but would not
15 listen at first, and it was after much persuasion
16 that the date for the interview was fixed for the
17 end of April.

18 Q You have stated that the Mutual Assistance
19 Pact concluded between Inner Mongolia and Manchukuo
20 was not because of any demand made by the Kwantung
21 Army but because of a request made by Prince Teh
22 himself. Is there no mistake on this point?

23 A I feel very much embarrassed to be called
24 a liar.

25 THE PRESIDENT: He was not called a liar.

TANAKA

CROSS

1 Q I wish you to answer merely whether that
2 was so or not.

3 A Yes.

4 Q Then, may I understand that the Kwantung
5 Army was always taking an autonomous attitude towards
6 the Mongolian problem -- was always taking a passive
7 attitude toward Mongolia?

8 A Yes. Up 'til 1935, when Prince Teh visited
9 Hsinking, the Kwantung Army took an active attitude.
10 But, since then, after being hounded by many de-
11 mands from Mongolia, it might be possible to say that
12 the Kwantung Army became passive.

13 Q By saying that the Kwantung Army took an
14 active attitude until the arrival of Prince Teh, do
15 you mean that you yourself had been taking an active
16 attitude?

17 A However much a fool I may be, if the atti-
18 tude of my senior officers are passive, I cannot
19 help but be in line with that attitude. To call
20 the Chief of Staff, General NISHIO, and those serv-
21 ing under him, passive, would be tantamount to an
22 insult against the Japanese Army. That is also an
23 insult to General MINAMI for it would be tantamount
24 to saying that he was not in full control of his
25 Army as Commander-in-Chief.

TANAKA

CROSS

1 Q I do not want to indulge in argument, so
2 I shall leave that matter and pass to my next
3 point.

4 You have stated that General DOHIHARA went
5 to Peking also on General MINAMI's orders to see
6 Sun Che-yuan. When was this?

7 A I think it was the middle of September,
8 1935, if my recollection is not mistaken.

9 Q No. Was this not on January 6, 1936?

10 A I think he went about the end of September
11 because my colleague, SENDA, accompanied DOHIHARA
12 on this mission.

13 Q But you have stated that when General
14 DOHIHARA went to Peking in September, 1935, he had
15 instructions with him. Have you seen these in-
16 structions?

17 A Yes. I know those instructions very well
18 inasmuch as I personally had a hand in drafting it.

19 Q Please tell us the contents of those in-
20 structions.

21 A As I have said before, one of the purposes
22 was anti-communism. Another purpose was to create
23 in North China an autonomous region to serve as a
24 buffer area.

25 Q But, on investigating the records, we find

TANAKA

CROSS

1 that December 31, 1937 the Vice-Minister of War,
2 following the instructions of the Minister of War,
3 sent instructions to the Chief of Staff of the Kwan-
4 tung Army concerning General DOHIHARA. Are you
5 aware of this?

6 A Will you tell me the contents?

7 Q In this order it is said that for the time
8 being General DOHIHARA shall be sent to North
9 China and shall be under the commander of the Japan-
10 ese forces in China and shall help the Hopeh-Chahar
11 Political Committee.

12 A Yes. I am quite sure that I saw it.

13 THE INTERPRETER: That is on December 31,
14 1935, and correction of the previous question which
15 should read also "1935" instead of "1937."

16 A (Continuing) May I explain? Major General
17 DOHIHARA went to Peking as an officer of the Kwantung
18 Army at the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the
19 Kwantung Army. General DOHIHARA went to North China
20 as an officer of the Kwantung Army, but the juris-
21 diction over the area was exercised by the Japanese
22 forces stationed in North China with headquarters in
23 Hsinking. Major General TADA, head of the North China
24 garrison forces, was extremely indignant over this
25 fact inasmuch as an officer coming into that area

1 under a different command would effect the coordina-
2 tion in command. And, therefore, as a result of
3 General TADA's repeated protests, General DOHIHARA
4 was transferred and attached to the North China Army
5 after the Hopeh-Chahar Political Council had been
6 set up.

7 Q Were you not at the time touring North
8 China and Chahar on official business?

9 A No. He was sent to Peiping at the orders
10 of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army as
11 an officer attached to the Kwantung Army.

12 Q That is not my question. Were not you,
13 yourself, at the end of 1935 in Chahar and North
14 China on official business?

15 A I left Hsinking by airplane on December 24
16 and arrived in Peiping on the 31st. And, while en
17 route, I passed through Dolan Nor and Kalgan.

18 Q When did you return?

19 A I left Peiping on the third of January; and,
20 after passing through West Sumito, arrived in Hsinking
21 on January 5.

22 THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now until
23 nine-thirty tomorrow morning.

24 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjourn-
25 ment was taken until Tuesday, 9 July 1946
at 0930.)